Marcos` son and namesake said the peace agreement with the MNLF under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Libyan head of state was “a success.” The agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region of 13 provinces and the cities of Mindanao and Palawan- then new: Basilan, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur – all in Mindanao – and Palawan and its interior towns. “The Tripoli agreement was a success. We had peace. We stopped fighting with the MNLF. But it was ignored in 1986, so that some of the agreements reached in the Tripoli agreement were not implemented. He went on the track,” Marcos said at a press conference Saturday afternoon at the Park Inn Hotel. Ferdinand Marcos then implemented the agreement by creating two autonomous regions (instead of one) of ten provinces (instead of thirteen). This led to the collapse of the peace pact and the resumption of hostilities between the MNLF and Philippine government forces. [10] [11] After more than 17 years of painstaking negotiations with the Philippine government (1996-2013), MILF appears to have succeeded in forging several peace agreements, including a new Tripoli agreement, signed in 2006. All agreements that have brought progressive benefits to MILF can be included in two important agreements: the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement (FAB) signed in 2012 and the Comprehensive Bangsamoro Agreement (CAB), signed two years later in 2014. The CAB has incorporated all the provisions not implemented into previous agreements, including the provisions of the VPA and the original Tripoli agreement.

Despite a number of lobbying measures and consultations at the community level, the new version of the BBL received very little support from Parliament. Both houses of Congress manipulated the BTC version and continued to undermine the intention to grant true autonomy to Bangsamoro, the main reason for all previous agreements, in particular the Tripoli agreement. President Marcos, however, found ways to encourage the MNLF to sign an agreement full of provisions that were unclear as to future implementation, such as mantra phrases such as “discuss later,” “fix later” or “determine later.” Eleven of the nineteen provisions of the agreement ended either with “discussing later” or “to be fixed or to be fixed at a later date.” Since signing an agreement with the MNLF, at the request of a world power like the OIC, was not a small concession for Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the agreement was seen as a Pyrrhic victory for the MNLF and a breakthrough for peace. But it has given only false hope to the peace electoral districts in the Philippines and has not kept its promise. The 2001 Tripoli Agreement cited the 1997 ceasefire agreement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Jakarta Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF, as well as an OIC resolution calling on the government and MILF to “immediately end armed hostilities and continue peace talks to find a peaceful solution to the problem in Mindanao.” Under the leadership of Fidel V. Ramos, the government and MNLF signed the final peace agreement in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1996. [11] He allowed qualified MNLF members to join the Philippine Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police and founded the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, dominated by the MNLF.